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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS TO PANEL I
QUESTION: In the attempt, as Cole Durham suggests, of looking
from the religious side in defining the respective territories of church
and state, when we do it through history and the passage of time as
possibly Madison was trying to suggest, I would like to ask something that is more contemporary and therefore more difficult and
comes out of an experience I recently confronted in Iowa. I am sure
many of you have read that there have been some racist activities
going on in Iowa. I was asked to give a talk about the Iowa tradition. Iowa was actively involved during the Fugitive Slave Act period in the Underground Railroad. We talked about the scope of
conscience that was shown during that period in opposition to concerns about "property rights" which the Court upheld in the Dred
Scott decision. 1 We discussed that people in Iowa and elsewhere in
spite of the decision were upset with the practice of slavery - not
just were not willing to participate in it, but were upset with the
practice as violating humanity, violating their consciences, and
many ways in the way you have defined conscience, and that their
consciences were so opposed that they were willing to take steps in
violation of the positive law of that time and oppose it to the point
of criminality. After making this statement, there was an individual
in the back of the room who stood up and asked me to compare
either positively or to show the distinctions that might be made between that process as was involved in the Fugitive Slave Act and the
activities of Operation Rescue in today's world, because many of
them claim very similar traditions and commitments .to that earlier
tradition.
JAMES WASHINGTON: I think that there is a connection between the two. I think that is a good analogy, although one has to
be careful about making historical analogies. If I heard you correctly, what disturbs me a great deal about those kinds of events is
the refusal to recognize that the social bond at the beginning, as you
have said, was one that excluded so many. The law often works to
support status quo. As a consequence - I think Professor Un1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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derkuffler is correct - religious and moral institutions and the notion of conscience - provide some hope. But there is one thing that
is not so much surprising as rather disappointing. One of the things
I have noticed about past dissenters is that they were willing to pay
the price. The feeling that one must have the protection of law
before one does what one thinks is right often impedes some from
working for change. I do not know exactly how to characterize it.
But this is more of a strong sentiment, kind of a hunch on my part,
than an accusation. I just think that an overall decline in religious
belief and moral belief is upon us. I am not sure what implications
that has for law. But this has profound implications for religious
and moral individuals. The message that went out in 1968, which
was delivered quite clearly by some very powerful forces in this
country, is that if you do take stands that are in opposition to status
quo, it may cost you your life. One thinks of the assassinations of
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy. In fact, commitment
to the point of death seems to be something that certainly never has
been a popular thing. But you do not see it too often these days.
MARK FACKLER: This question really asks us what constitutes
responsible civil disobedience. And we have come to realize that
those who opposed slavery were exercising it; but we have not come
to realize it, or there is no consensus, with respect to the pro-life or
pro-abortion movement. We do not know who the heroes of that
movement are going to be. Maybe a hundred years from now we
will, but we do not yet. But it does seem to me that one of the
hallmarks of responsible civil disobedience is talk, not merely action.
This is not to say that pro-lifers have not attempted to express their
argument in compelling words as well as with sit-ins and demonstrations, but it is to say that I do not think yet that the pro-life movement has seriously talked about the privacy question that Justice
Blackmun's decision raised. And that seems to me to be the crux; at
least, that gets much closer to the problem of conscience with respect to the abortion controversy. And I need, myself, to be more
informed about how a right to life and a right to privacy interact. I
would like more talk and somewhat less confrontation so that I can
get clearer myself in terms of public policy with respect to who the
heroes of the current controversy ought to be. I think also Justice
Scalia was trying to get at something of the question here in Em-
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ployment Division v. Smith2 when he suggested that we cannot have
every conscience a law unto itself;3 that would be a problem in democratic order. And so, as we all know, he reiterated the right of the
State of Oregon to make its own exceptions; and having made none,
in this case the law would stand.
JAMES WASHINGTON.- One of the things I was trying to say was
that I do not think that there is such a thing as responsible civil
disobedience for someone who takes conscience seriously. I mean,
that is a view from the standpoint of status quo. How can I be a
responsible disobedient person to a law which I find morally offensive? It reminds me of the insistence on the part of the dominant
white community that those who were suffering under Jim Crowism
should dissent nonviolently while they were the victims of violence,
unrepentant state and local communal violence. What I was trying
to suggest is that there seems to be a real irony in the question itself
because there is this prevalent idea that you do not have to pay a
price for being against something. And I think that is, to me, endemic to the very notion of conscience. If you really believe that
God is involved in your moral and religious stance and that God
would have you do X, Y, Z for your principles, to raise the legal
question strikes me as contradictory, though many people do it.
COLE DURHAM. One of the problems - and I think the reason
why I think the responsibility issue is a very important one - is
that a person's religious views may take very seriously the constitutional principles or the principles of the regime where he or she
lives. In my own tradition, one of our Articles of Faith states: "We
believe in being subject to kings, presidents, rulers, and magistrates,
in obeying, honoring, and sustaining the law."' In the Mormon tradition, this belief survived some very painful periods. We faced an
order in Missouri to exterminate all Mormons. Property was expropriated, and church members were driven out of the state. Similar
persecution and deprivation of property occurred in Utah in the
1880s at the hands of the federal government. But there was a deep
sense that the way to -seek redress was, at least initially, to go
2. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3. Id. at 885.
4. Article of Faith 12, The Articles of Faith of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, reprinted in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM 486 (Daniel H. Ludlow ed., 1992)..
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through legal channels. This was also the reason that the Reynolds5
case was appealed: the objective was to test the constitutionality of
antipolygamy legislation by invoking available legal procedures. It
seems to me that it is not necessarily a betrayal of religious principles to respect such legal channels, particularly if among that it is
good to have societies with laws and that governments in general,
even though imperfect, are ordained by God. This makes the problem of how responsible one should be and how that responsibility
should be structured considerably more complex.
JAMES WASHINGTON.- As I listen to the rap music of urban African-American folk culture, they are saying that the law serves status quo. They are also asking - and this is the deeper point: "What
do you do when the law is evil?" Whether in the history of AfricanAmericans in the South or of Jews in Nazi Germany, the oppressed
have experienced the legal system as a source of the masking and
nurture of abusive governmental and social power.
EMILY FOWLER HARTIGAN [University of Nebraska]: It seems
to me that the last three comments tap something which to me is
reminiscent most of all of the Crito6 where Socrates is talking about
his profound fidelity to law; it is in fact the perversion of the law
which he cannot be faithful to. And such fidelity is something which
requires - because of the nature, I think, of what the law, as one of
God's gifts to us is - that the price will be that high; and that in
some ways anything that is cheaper suggests that the act comes out
of a sense of "my sovereignty versus the state's sovereignty," which
is not my understanding of what the American law of the land is. Is
not the American law of the land that the sovereignty resides in the
people? That the unenumerated rights stay with the people? Isn't
the whole point that the sovereignty has not been given fully to the
state?
DOUGLAS STURM: One time I coined the phrase - which may
not have been novel with me - the "dilemma of the constitutionalist." The dilemma of the constitutionalist is this. On the one hand,
in keeping with the idea of the sovereignty of the people, we must,
of course, let the people make their own basic decisions about the
shape of their common life. The people, not the state, are sovereign.
5. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
6. PLATO, Crito in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 27 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington
Cairns eds. 1961).
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On the other hand, the people may be wrong. And when they are
wrong, they stand in need of correction. But who is there to correct
them when they are wrong?
What is needed is a procedure whereby the people can engage in
some process of continuous self-correction. What would that mean?
How is that possible? Following James Washington, I would, once
again, affirm that in a sense we are obsessed by conscience; we are
driven to follow our conscience. But, I would insist, our conscience
should be informed by "reason," even as reason must heed the call
of conscience and considerations of reason must be brought into dialectical relationship.
At this point I would like to quote from William Penn. I have
before me a copy of his classic statement, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience.' He wrote this document while in jail in defiance
of a law which, in his judgment, contravened the Quakers' right to
freedom of conscience. You recall that he and William Mead were
jailed in 1670 for violating the Conventicle Act - a case that, in
turn, led to the famous great Bushell's Case,8 upholding the integrity of the jury system. After Penn's father paid the imposed fine
and Penn was released, he immediately defied the law again and
was, once more, jailed in 1671. At that time he wrote his defense of
"Liberty of Conscience." Among his arguments, Penn insists that
genuine faith and rational judgment are correlative. So he writes:
"[I1n order to believe, we must first will; to will, we must judge; to
judge anything, we must first understand . . . .The understanding
can never be convinced, nor properly submit, but by such arguments
as are rational, persuasive, and suitable to its nature . . . ."I Faith
and, I would submit, conscience must be informed by rational discourse. According to Quaker doctrine, all of us possess the inner
light. We are therefore obliged both to speak and to listen to each
other. Reason entails intercommunication. Through that process of
speaking and listening, our conscience may be refined, even transformed. Or, in other terms, public discourse is a means of subjecting
our conscience as it has been formed in times past to correction and
enlightenment. Through public discourse, as a manifestation of dialogic reason, we may arrive at new insights and be led in new
7. WILLIAM PENN, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience, in I COLLECTION
WILLIAM PENN 443 (Joseph Besse ed., 1726).
8. 124 Eng. Rep. 10,006 (1670).
9. PENN, supra note 7, at 451-52 (with modernized punctuation and spelling).
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directions.
So in the spirit of constitutionalism, to let the people settle upon
the basic policies that shall govern their common life does not mean
merely to let individuals or groups register their pre-given convictions and interests in some kind of battle royal to secure.a majority.
It means, more profoundly, to draw the people into a rigorous process of discourse, of self-criticism and self-correction, until they can
arrive, through a dialogic give-and-take, at some consensus - although, to be sure, that consensus is susceptible to re-examination
and transformation at any point. That is why the public forum is so
essential to politics. This, I submit, is the sense of Mark Fackler's
insistence that all the people, from their diverse religious perspectives should be brought together in a common forum to engage in
discussion with each other.
And this is why James Washington suggests that, given the current turmoil over abortion, what is most lacking and most needed is
for all factions to talk with each other. At the moment, groups opposing each other on this prickly and divisive issue are not talking
with each other; they are screaming at each other. As groups clash
with each other, they gloss over the excruciating dilemmas that
abortion entails. At moments, I become weary of both pro-choice
and pro-life constituencies. In one sense, I must admit, they are all
"conscientious." That is, they are sincere in their respective appeals
to conscience. But in another sense, they are not "conscientious."
That is, for a fully and adequately informed conscience, they need
to talk over the full range of questions entailed in the issue of abortion, from the condition and status of women in modern society to
the character and moral significance of fetal life, but including as
well the broader economic and political meaning of the principle of
respect for life and the kinds of occasions and situations in which
death, even if tragic, is nonetheless warranted.
Within this context we may distinguish the kind of civil disobedience characteristic of Martin Luther King's civil rights movement
and the kind of civil disobedience which was part of an extensive
political discourse. Repeatedly he stressed that civil disobedience
was but a stage in a negotiating process. If the powers-that-be refused to engage in rational discourse about the rights of the African-American community, then actions of civil disobedience were
deemed appropriate as a means of speaking through action to provoke a response and to move the political process along. Moreover,
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as such, civil disobedience was an expression of a profoundly religious understanding of our essential connectedness. Operation Rescue, on the other hand, as I understand it, employs civil disobedience as an oppositional tactic. It is less concerned to draw us
together in a common forum of mutual respect with the end in mind
of a "beloved community" than to conquer all their opponents on
this single issue. Its concern is not so much discourse and consensus
as it is opposition and subjection.

